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GERMAN UNIFICATION: CONSTITUTIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Albrecht Randelzhofer*
INTRODUCTION

It is a privilege to be invited to speak abroad about the legal
problems of German unification. Coming from a relatively small
country, I cannot expect a special interest from U.S. lawyers about
German legal problems, but unification is not a German problem
alone. Other States are substantially involved in the political and legal
problems, especially the Four Allied Powers, the Member States of the
European Communities, and Poland.
As a consequence, three different realms of law must be taken into
account when dealing with the legal problems of German unification:
(1) German constitutional law, (2) public international law, and
(3) the law of the European Communities.
It goes without saying that it is impossible within the time available to deal with all the relevant legal items in even a superficial manner. I will have to concentrate on a few of the most important issues,
confessing that the decision on what is important is to a certain degree
influenced by my personal evaluation. Even with these selected
problems it will not be possible to elaborate on them in a detailed way.
I will have to confine myself to some sort of outline, thus not aiming at
indisputable final conclusions, but being content if I succeed in instigating a lively and helpful discussion.

I.
A.

GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The Idea of Unification in the Constitutions
of the Two Germanies

The Basic Law of 1949, the Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Germany, always clung to the aim of German unity. This is clearly
demonstrated by the statement of the preamble that the makers of the
Basic Law "have also acted on behalf of those Germans to whom par* Full Professor, Free University of Berlin, Member, Permanent Court of Arbitration. This
article is adapted from a lecture given on September 12, 1990 at the University of Michigan Law
School to the Seminar on Public International Law offered by Professors Bruno Simma and
Joseph Weiler. The character of a lecture has been preserved, and only minor modifications have
been made. References to literature are deliberately restricted because German literature is not
easily accessible to American readers and literature in English is almost nonexistent.

Fall 1991]

German Unification

ticipation was denied," and that "the entire German people are called
upon to achieve in free self-determination the unity and freedom of
Germany."' The Federal Constitutional Court has repeatedly emphasized that this is not only the expression of a policy directive, but also
2
valid law binding on all State organs.
The attitude of the German Democratic Republic toward the problem of German unification has changed over time. Article 1 of the
Constitution of October 7, 1949 states that "Germany is an indivisible
democratic republic... ." -3 The Preamble of the Constitution of April
6, 1968 speaks of two German States, but Article 6 still adheres to one
German nation. 4 The Constitution of September 27, 19745 totally
abandons the idea of any German unity. The notion of "Germany" is
carefully avoided.
Since the crumbling of the Wall on November 9, 1989, the main
parts of the Constitution of 1974 have been invalid. Very soon after
the Wall fell, hundreds of thousands of people shouted, "Germany,
our undivided fatherland." The elections of March 18, 1990, the first
free, democratic elections in the German Democratic Republic, expressed the desire of the overwhelming majority of the population for
German unification. The Volkskammer, the parliament of the German Democratic Republic, repeatedly expressed the same desire.
B.

The Reunification Articles of the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Germany

The Basic Law contains two provisions describing how to unify
Germany legally. 6 Both have been neglected and almost forgotten
during the last decades. Some of the commentaries on the Basic Law
consider them to be of only theoretical significance. Recently, however, these provisions turned out to be of highly practical importance.
1. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] pmbl. (F.R.G.).
2. See Judgment of July 31, 1973, Bundesverfassungsgericht [Constitutional Court], 36 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1, 17 (F.R.G.); Judgment of Aug. 17,
1956, 5 BVerfGE 85, 127 (F.R.G.).
3. DIE VERFASSUNG DER DDR of Oct. 7, 1949 [Constitution] [VERF] art. I (G.D.R.), reprinted in 2 QUELLEN ZUM STAATSRECHT DER NEUZEIT 292, 293 (Ernst R. Huber ed., 1951).
4. VERF of Apr. 6, 1968, pmbl. & art. 6, reprinted in SIEGFRIED MAMPEL, DIE SOZIALISTISCHE VERFASSUNG DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK 3, 5 (1972).
5. VERF of Sept. 27, 1974, reprinted in I THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY & THE
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 95 (Giinther Doeker & Jens
A. Briickner eds., 1979) [hereinafter I INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS].

6. GG arts. 23, 146; Jochen A. Frowein, Germany Reunited, 51 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT [ZAoRV] 336 (1991); Christian
Tomuschat, Wege zur deutschen Einheit, 49 VEROFFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DER
DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER 70 (1990).
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Notwithstanding their importance, as is also true for other constitutional provisions, these provisions are short and unclear.
The first of the two provisions is Article 23. Sentence 1 enumerates the Lander (the states) of which the Federal Republic of Germany
is composed, citing, for example, Bavaria and Hamburg, and states
that the Basic Law shall apply in the territories of these Linder.7 Sentence 2 says, "In other parts of Germany it [the Basic Law] shall be
put into force on their accession." That means that other parts of
Germany may become parts of the Federal Republic by unilateral accession, with the Basic Law remaining the constitution of the then
enlarged Federal Republic.
The second relevant provision of the Basic Law is Article 146. Article 146 states, "[tihis Basic Law shall cease to be in force on the day
on which a constitution adopted by a free decision of the German people comes into force." 9 There are, therefore, two possibilities of German unification under Article 146: (1) the unilateral accession of
other parts of Germany with the replacement of the Basic Law by a
new constitution adopted by simple majority or (2) a unification of
both German States into a new State with a new constitution.
Unification under either Article 23 or Article 146 is constitutionally possible. There was some debate among politicians and scholars
of constitutional law as to which would be better. The main argument
against Article 23 is that accession based on Article 23 would mean
the surrender of the German Democratic Republic. Some even speak
of an annexation or AnschluB, alluding to the incorporation of Austria
into the German Reich in 1938. In my view this is not a valid argument. Article 23 presupposes the free and unilateral decision of the
German Democratic Republic to accede to the Federal Republic of
Germany.
Against unification under Article 146 of the Basic Law it is argued
that elaborating a new constitution would be too time consuming.
Further, it is stressed that the Basic Law is a good constitution, that it
is accepted by the vast majority of the German people, and even that it
is the best that they have ever had.
C.

Unification in Practice

On August 23, 1990 the Volkskammer decided by a two-thirds majority in favor of the accession of the German Democratic Republic to
7. GG art. 23(1).
8. Id. art. 23(2).
9. Id. art. 146.
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the Federal Republic of Germany. The accession was to be based on
Article 23 of the Basic Law and to become effective on October 3,
1990.
However, to avoid even the appearance of a "surrender" or "annexation," the conditions of the accession were negotiated by the Unification Treaty of August 31, 1990 between the two German States.' 0
The main purposes of this treaty are to provide transitional regulations
for a smooth adaptation of the two German States and to preserve
some of the "achievements" of the German Democratic Republic.
The Unification Treaty does not change the substance of the constitutional basis of the unification. That basis remains unilateral accession
under Article 23 of the Basic Law." This is demonstrated by the intention of both sides to use Article 23 just in case they failed to negotiate the treaty or their respective parliaments failed to ratify it. For
those cases, both sides have explicitly declared that the basis of unification would remain Article 23 of the Basic Law and that the detailed
problems would be regulated by an act of the parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany.
D.

Other ConstitutionalProblems

The Unification Treaty will bring about German unification, but it
does not solve all of the constitutional problems.
1. The Future of Article 146
Perhaps the most crucial problem is the meaning and importance
of the new wording of Article 146. Article 4(1) of the Unification
Treaty changes the preamble of the Basic Law to state that the German people have achieved the unity and freedom of Germany in free
self-determination.' 2 Article 4(2) of the Unification Treaty repeals Article 23 of the Basic Law.' 3 These changes to the Basic Law are the
logical consequences of the achievement of German unification. They
demonstrate that the so-called "German question" is now answered
and that no other parts of Germany remain for future unification.
It would have been logical to repeal Article 146 of the Basic Law
as well because it also deals with methods for German unification.
However, article 4(6) of the Unification Treaty only amends Article
146 by inserting a new introductory sentence saying that German
10. Treaty on the Establishment of German Unity, Aug. 31, 1990, F.R.G.-G.D.R., 1990
Bundesgesetzblatt II [BGBI.] 889, 30 I.L.M. 457 (1991)
11. Id. art. 1(1), 30 I.L.M. at 464.
12. Id. art. 4(1), 30 I.L.M. at 465.
13. Id. art. 4(2), 30 I.L.M. at 465.

[hereinafter the Unification Treaty].
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unity is achieved. The rest of the Article remains unchanged. 1 4 In
article 5 of the Unification Treaty, the governments of both German
States recommend that within the next two years the legislative bodies
of unified Germany think over the problems of applying the new Article 146.15
There is already considerable controversy over how best to understand this new constitutional provision. Some writers think its continuance is a basis for amending, even fundamentally changing, the Basic
Law either by simple majority vote in both the Bundestag and the
Bundesrat or by referendum, in other words changing the Basic Law
outside the regular amendment procedure.
The regular procedure, found in Article 79 of the Basic Law, requires the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the
Bundestag and two-thirds of the votes in the Bundesrat.16 Article 79
additionally declares inadmissible amendments affecting the division
of the federation into Lander, the participation on principle of the
Lander in legislation, or the basic principles laid down in Articles 1
and 20.17 The above understanding of the new Article 146 makes it
sort of a time bomb for the whole constitution.
It is very doubtful, however, whether this is the correct understanding of the new Article 146. It must be considered that the accession of the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of
Germany is based on Article 23 which implies accession to the Basic
Law; this is demonstrated by the wording of Article 23.18 It is true
that this way of unification was not the only one. There was also the
possibility of unification based on Article 146 implying a new constitution for unified Germany. Both ways were legally possible, but it was
not possible to combine both ways. 19 It would be contradictory to
accede to the Federal Republic of Germany on the basis of Article 23,
i.e., under the continuing reign of the Basic Law, and to foresee by
this very act of accession the possibility of abolishing the Basic Law.
2.

The Legal Importance of the Unification Treaty
After Unification

Another important question is the legal significance of the Unifica14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

GG art. 146; Unification Treaty, supra note 10, art. 4(6), 30 I.L.M. at 466.
Unification Treaty, supra note 10, art. 5, 30 I.L.M. at 467.
GG art. 79(2).
Id. art. 79(3).
Id. art. 23; Unification Treaty, supra note 10, art. 1(1), 30 I.L.M. at 464.

19. Josef Isensee, Staatseinheit und Verfassungskontinuitat, 49 VEROFFENTLICHUNGEN DER
VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER 39, 53 (1990).
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tion Treaty after October 3, 1990 when the German Democratic Republic no longer exists.
The Unification Treaty is a treaty under public international law.
When one party of such a bilateral treaty vanishes, who then is entitled to claim the rights given by the treaty against the other party?
Article 44 of the Unification Treaty tries to tackle this problem by
saying that the Ldnder to be restored within the territory of the German Democratic Republic are entitled to assert the rights flowing
from the Unification Treaty. 20 The old traditional Lnder within the
territory of the German Democratic Republic (Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia)
were abolished in 1953. They were restored on October 3, 1990. Ultimately this means that those Ldnder can sue the Federal Republic of
Germany before the Federal Constitutional Court for an alleged
breach of the treaty.
However, it is not altogether clear to what extent the provisions of
article 44 of the Unification Treaty preserve the rights of the German
Democratic Republic as a party to the treaty. Article 45 of the Unification Treaty says that, after German unification, the treaty continues
to be valid as Federal Law. 21 It can then be changed, in principle, by
the legislative bodies of the Federal Republic of Germany. Otherwise,
these provisions would stand eternally as a barrier against the sovereignty of parliament.
3. Expropriation Issues
A further provision of the Unification Treaty that will certainly
cause many controversies in practice is article 4(5) in connection with
article 41 and annex III of the Unification Treaty. 22 Annex III states
that expropriations which took place within the territory of the German Democratic Republic between 1945 and 1949 will not be
23
revised.
Voices are saying that this amounts to a violation of Article 14 of
the Basic Law protecting property. 24 On the other hand, Article 14 is
not retroactively applicable to what happened in the German Democratic Republic during that period. 25 The problem is whether the in20.
21.
22.
23.

Unification Treaty, supra note 10, art. 44, 30 I.L.M. at 497.
Id. art. 45(2), 30 I.L.M. at 498.
Id. arts. 4(5), 41, 30 I.L.M. at 466, 496; Id., annex III, 1990 BGBI. II at 1237.
Id. annex III, 1990 BGBI. II at 1237.

24. GG art.

14;

OTro KIMMINICH,

DIE

EIGENTUMSGARANTIE

IM

PROZEB

DER

WIEDERVEREINIGUNG 69 passim (1990); Herbert v. Arnim, Entzug der Grundrechte aus Opportunitat?, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Sept. 6, 1990, at 8.

25. Hans-Jirgen

Papier,

Verfassungsrechtliche Probleme der Eigentumsregelung im
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clusion of such a regulation in the Unification Treaty is in itself a
violation of Article 14. Additionally, it may be asked whether article
4(5) is compatible with Article 3 of the Basic Law, equality before the.
law, 26 as the Unification Treaty deals differently with expropriations
between 1945 and 1949 on the one hand and expropriations after 1949
on the other hand. It is easy to foresee that this problem will be
brought before the Federal Constitutional Court by former proprietors
whose property within the German Democratic Republic was expro-

priated between 1945 and
II.

1949.27

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GERMAN UNIFICATION

A.

Rights and Responsibilities of the FourAllied Powers

Normally, if two States want to unite they don't have to ask other
States to agree. In the case of German unification the situation is quite
different because of the rights of the Four Allied Powers. 28 The origin
and content of these rights are somewhat different in the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.
1. The Federal Republic of Germany
After the unconditional surrender of the German armed forces, the
Four Allied Powers (France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,
and the United States) made a formal declaration on June 5, 1945 (the
Berlin Declaration). 29 In the Berlin Declaration the Four Allied Powers stated that they were assuming supreme authority with respect to
Germany, but emphasized that the assumption of supreme authority
30
did not affect the annexation of Germany.
When the Federal Republic came into existence on May 23, 1949 it
was far from being a sovereign State, quite the opposite. It was a State
under the rule of the Occupation Statute of May 12, 1949,31 lacking
Einigungsvertrag, 44 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 193, 195 (1991); Edzard
Schmidt-Jortzig, Sind nicht in Wahrheit bloB Hoffnungen enttuscht worden?, FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Sept. 22, 1990, at 10.
26. GG art. 3.
27. This prediction turned out to be correct, but the claims brought before the Federal Constitutional Court have been rejected. In its Judgment of April 23, 1991 the Federal Constitutional Court held that the relevant regulations of the Unification Treaty were compatible with the
Basic Law. Judgment of April 23, 1991, Bundesverfassungsgercht, 18 EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFT

121 (1991).

28. Jochen A. Frowein, Die Verfassungslage Deuischlands im Rahmen des Vd1kerrechts, 49
VERbFFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER 7,

12

(1990).
29. Berlin Declaration, June 5, 1945, 60 Stat. 1649, 68 U.N.T.S. 189.
30. Id. pmbl., 60 Stat. at 1650, 68 U.N.T.S. at 190.
31. Council of the Allied High Commission, DeclarationConcerning the Entry into Forceof
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competence in the areas of foreign and military policy. Sovereignty
was conceded to the Federal Republic of Germany by the Convention
on the Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic
of Germany of May 26, 1952 (the General Treaty), as amended on
October 23, 1954.32 Article 1 states that the occupation regime will
end when the General Treaty enters into force. "The Federal Republic shall have full authority over its internal and external affairs, except
as provided in the present convention. ' 33 However, article 1 is immediately followed by article 2 saying that "[tlhe Three Powers retain, in
view of the international situation, the rights, heretofore exercised or
held by them, relating to ... (b) Berlin, and (c) Germany as a whole,
including the unification of Germany and a peace settlement."' 34 This
demonstrates that, even after the entry into force of the General
Treaty and notwithstanding article 1 of the General Treaty, the Federal Republic of Germany was not sovereign in every respect.
2. The German Democratic Republic
The legal situation is very much the same for the German Democratic Republic. The above-mentioned Berlin Declaration of June 5,
1945 is of importance, too.
The German Democratic Republic came into existence shortly after the Federal Republic of Germany. It was also not a sovereign
State. When, on March 26, 1954, the Soviet Union made a formal
declaration of sovereignty for the German Democratic Republic, it retained its rights regarding an all-German character (i.e., its rights as to
Germany as a whole). 35 This position was upheld in the consecutive
treaties of friendship concluded between the Soviet Union and the
German Democratic Republic on September 20, 1955,36 June 12,

1964, 37 and October 7,

1975.38

the Occupation Statute, OFFICIAL GAZETrE OF THE ALLIED HIGH COMMISSION FOR GER-

Sept. 23, 1949, No. 1, at 2.
32. Convention on the Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of
Germany, May 26, 1952, as amended Oct. 23, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 4251, 5599, 331 U.N.T.S. 327
hereinafter the General Treaty].
33. Id. art. 1(1), 6 U.S.T. at 4254.
34. Id. art. 2(1), 6 U.S.T. at 4254.
35. Statement by the Soviet Government on the Relations between the Soviet Union and the
German Democratic Republic, Mar. 26, 1954, reprintedin I INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra
note 5, at 160 [hereinafter the Soviet Statement].
36. Treaty Concerning Relations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
German Democratic Republic, Sept. 20, 1955, U.S.S.R.-G.D.R., pmbl., 226 U.N.T.S. 201, 208.
37. Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation, June 12, 1964, U.S.S.R.G.D.R., art. 9, 553 U.N.T.S. 249, 264.
38. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, Oct. 7, 1975, U.S.S.R.G.D.R., art. 10, 1077 U.N.T.S. 75, 86 [hereinafter 1975 Friendship Treaty].
MANY,
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3. The Two-Plus-Four Talks
From a political point of view, it was interesting that, on the occasion of the admission of the two German States to the United Nations,
the Four Allied Powers made a joint declaration on November 9,
1972. The declaration stated that the admission of the German States
to the United Nations did not adversely affect the rights and responsi39
bilities of the Four Allied Powers relating to Germany as a whole.
Consequently, it is not possible to effect German unification by an
agreement between only the two German States. Therefore, the TwoPlus-Four Talks started in Ottawa on February 1990. These talks led
to the conclusion of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect
to Germany, signed on September 12, 1990 in Moscow.4°
For Germany the most important provision of this treaty is article
7, which states that
(1) [The Four Allied Powers] hereby terminate their rights and
responsibilities relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole. As
a result, the corresponding, related quadripartite agreements, decisions and practices are terminated and all related Four Power
institutions are dissolved.
(2) The united Germany shall have accordingly full sovereignty
41
over its internal and external affairs.
According to article 8, this treaty is subject to ratification. 42 On
the German side it will be ratified by unified Germany and will therefore apply to unified Germany. That a treaty of such fundamental
importance requires ratification is quite common and in line with public international law. It is also important that article 8 subjects the
treaty to ratification or acceptance "as soon as possible."' 43 Additionally, when signing the treaty in Moscow, the Four Allied Powers
stated that they would later issue a common declaration to express
their intention not to exercise their retained rights from October 3,
1990 onward. They did this because it was quite clear that the process
of ratification would not end before the day of German unification.
The Joint Declaration was signed on October 1, 1990 in New York,
and the two German governments officially took notice of it by signing
39. Declaration on the Question of U.N. Membership for the Two Germanies, Nov. 9, 1972,
157 BULLETIN (Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung) 1884, 12 I.L.M. 217.
40. Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, 104 BULLETIN
(Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung) 1153, 29 I.L.M. 1186 [hereinafter the Final
Settlement].
41. Id. art. 7, 29 I.L.M. at 1191.
42. Id. art. 8, 29 I.L.M. at 1192.
43. Id.

German Unification

Fall 1991]

too. That means in substance that the retained rights of the Four Allied Powers ended no sooner than the termination of the ratification
process but were suspended from the date of unification.
4.

The Legal Capacity of the Four Powers

It is quite obvious that this is a very satisfactory development for
Germany. I do hope that it will not give the impression of ingratitude
when I think about whether the Four Powers freely decided to grant
sovereignty to Germany or whether they were under a legal obligation
to do so.
In my view it is at least open to doubt whether the Four Powers
had the legal capability to hinder German unification. When I cited
article 2 of the General Treaty between the Three Allied Powers and
the Federal Republic of Germany by which the Three Powers retained
their rights to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, I did not cite the full
text of that provision. Reading the full text it becomes clear that the
Three Powers retained these rights on the basis of a given political
situation. This becomes apparent on examining the full wording of
article 2, "In the view of the international situation, which has so far
prevented the reunification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace
settlement, the Three Powers retain [their] rights .... "" That means
that the Three Powers retained these rights for the purpose of bringing
about German reunification. Support for this view also comes from
article 7 of the General Treaty which states that a peace settlement for
the whole of Germany, "a reunified Germany enjoying a liberal-democratic constitution, like that of the Federal Republic," and a Germany
integrated within the European community are essential aims of the
45
common policy of the parties to the treaty.
As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it must be emphasized
that it retained rights to Germany as a whole in the Declaration of
Sovereignty of 1954, but in the same document committed itself to the
aim of a unified Germany. 46 It is true that we read nothing of this
commitment in the Treaty of Friendship of 1975 between the Soviet
Union and the German Democratic Republic, 47 but it must be considered that the Soviet Union and both German States are parties to the
44. General Treaty, supra note 32, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 5600, 331 U.N.T.S. at 328, 330, as
amended Oct. 23, 1954.
45. Id. art. 7, 6 U.S.T. at 5601, 331 U.N.T.S. at 334, as amended Oct. 23, 1954. The importance of this provision is also emphasized in Frowein, supra note 28, at 12.
46. Soviet Statement, supra note 35.
47. 1975 Friendship Treaty, supra note 38, 1077 U.N.T.S. at 76. In fact, articles 6 and 7
could be seen as a break from past commitments to German unification. Id., arts. 6, 7, 1077
U.N.T.S. at 86.
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two Covenants on Human Rights of December 19, 1966, elaborated by
the United Nations. 4 8 The common article 1 of these agreements
states that "all peoples have the right of self-determination. '4 9 There
are some doubts as to the notion of "peoples," but it would be difficult
to argue that the whole of the population of both German States is not
entitled to the right of self-determination. The common view is that a
people's right of self-determination includes a right to have its own
State.
B. Other Public InternationalLaw Problems
Regarding German Unification
1. The Treaties of the Two Germanies
A question of considerable importance is what will happen to the
treaties of the two German States. The law of State succession
notwithstanding, the Vienna Convention of August 22, 1978 on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (the Vienna Convention) 50 is
an extremely shaky ground on which to base a conclusion. By far the
majority of German writers are of the opinion that, according to the
rule of movable treaty frontiers, the treaties of the Federal Republic of
Germany will continue while the treaties of the German Democratic
Republic will come to an end, except those regulating a territorial regime. 5 1 In my view the rule of movable treaty frontiers is only applicable to cases where no party to a treaty vanishes, i.e., in cases of a
transfer of territory from one State to another and in cases of secession
and separation. The applicability of this rule is undisputed only in the
case of a transfer of territory from one State to another as is demon52
strated by article 15 of the just mentioned Vienna Convention.
German unification is not a case of the transfer of territory between States but rather of the incorporation of one State into another,
48. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force
Jan. 3, 1976).
49. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 48, art. 1(1), 999
U.N.T.S. at 173; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note
48, art. 1(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5. See Frowein, supra note 28, at 12; Clemens v. Goetze, Die
Rechte der Alliierten auf Mitwirkung bei der deutschen Einigung, 43 NJW 2161, 2163 (1990).
50. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, opened for signature
Aug. 23, 1978, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.80/31 [hereinafter the Vienna Convention].
51. See sources cited in Albrecht Randelzhofer, Deutsche Einheit und europaische Integration, 49 VEROFFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER

101, 106 n.14 (1990).
52. Vienna Convention, supra note 50, art. 15.
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making article 31 of theiVienna Convention the relevant provision.53
At first'sight, the wording of article 31 could lead to the conclusion
that it only applies when two or more States unite to form a new successor State. However, the travaux prnparatoireswithin the International Law Commission prove that article 31 also includes
incorporation. 54 Article 31(1) says that any treaty of the involved
States "continues in force in respect of the successor State" with two
exceptions. 55 First, the States can agree otherwise. Second, it could
appear from the treaty that its application with respect to the successor State would be incompatible with the object and purpose of56the
treaty or would radically change the conditions for its operation.
One might possibly argue that, for example, the Warsaw Pact and
the Comecon Treaty will not continue in force for unified Germany as
this would be incompatible with the object and purpose of those treaties. Otherwise, Germany would be a member of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, of the European Communities and Comecon.
Obviously, this would not be a reasonable result even under the
auspices of article 31(2) which states that any treaty continuing in
force in conformity with paragraph 1 shall apply only with respect to
the part of the territory of the successor State in which the treaty was
in force at the date of the succession of States.57 Still, under article 31
almost all of the other treaties of the German Democratic Republic
would continue to be in force in unified Germany.
On the other hand, it is very doubtful whether article 31 reflects
valid customary law. 58 The majority of authors are of the opinion
that, in the case of incorporation, the treaties of the incorporated State
come to an end whereas the treaties of the incorporating State continue and are extended to the enlarged territory of that State.59 Some
State practice in favor of this solution can also be found. 6°
The Unification Treaty follows the substance of existing customary
law but modifies it to some extent. Article 11 says that the treaties of
53. Id. art. 31.

54. See Report of the Commission to the GeneralAssembly, [1974] 2(l) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
157, 253, U.N. Doc. A/9610/Rev. 1.
55. Vienna Convention, supra note 50, art. 31(1).
56. Id.
57. Id. art. 31(2).
58. See ALFRED VERDROSS & BRUNO SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES VbLKERRECHT: THEORIE
UND PRAXIs 613 (3d ed. 1984). This is the view of the majority of the writers on the subject.
59. See, e.g., 1(1) GEORG DAHM, VbLKERRECHT 163 (Jost Delbriick & Riidiger Wolfrum

eds., 2d ed. 1989).
60. Examples include the incorporation of Texas into the United States, of Italian Principalities into Savoy-Piedmont, of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union, and of Austria into the

German Reich.
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the Federal Republic of Germany will continue and will be extended
to the territory of the former German Democratic Republic. 61 However, some treaties mentioned in annex I of the Unification Treaty are
excluded from this extension. Those are the treaties regulating the
special relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Three Allied Powers in consequence of World War II (e.g., the above
mentioned General Treaty) and the treaties regulating the stationing
of foreign troops in the Federal Republic of Germany, especially
within the framework of NATO. 62 However, it must be emphasized
that the NATO Treaty as such does not fall under this category. This
treaty will be applicable in substance after the unification of Germany
to the whole territory of the united German States.
As far as the treaties of the German Democratic Republic are concerned, article 12 of the Unification Treaty says that these treaties will
be reviewed as to whether they will continue, will be adapted, or will
come to an end, thus taking into account the interests of the other
parties to the treaties. 63 This procedure was confirmed in a letter by
the Foreign Ministers of both German States to the Four Allied Powers on the occasion of the signing of the Final Settlement concerning
Germany on September 12, 1990 in Moscow.
This partial deviation from the rules of customary international
law is possible because the rules of State succession are far from
mandatory. Political considerations made it necessary not to rely totally on the rules of customary international law. It would have been
highly difficult, if not impossible, to persuade the Soviet Union to accept, for example, the replacement of Soviet troops in Germany not
only by German troops but also by the troops of other NATO States.
It was certainly more political bargaining than legal reasoning that
made the Soviet Union ready to accept German unification with unified Germany remaining a member of NATO. 64
Germany and NATO had to pay a price for that result. Unified
Germany will have to reduce the personnel strength of its armed
forces to 370,000.65 It will have to adhere to the already existing obligations of the two German States not to manufacture, possess, or con61. Unification Treaty, supra note 10, art. 11, 30 I.L.M. at 471.
62. Id. annex I, 1990 BGBI. II at 907.
63. Id. art. 12, 30 I.L.M. at 472.
64. See Final Settlement, supra note 40, art. 6, 29 I.L.M. at 1191. This is the provision which
allows the unified Germany to remain in NATO. "The right of the united Germany to belong to
alliances, with all the rights and responsibilities arising therefrom, shall not be affected by the
present Treaty." Id. See also Torsten Stein, External Security and Military Aspects of German
Unification, 51 ZA6RV 451 (1991).

65. Final Settlement, supra note 40, art 3(2), 29 I.L.M. at 1189-90.
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trol nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. 66 Until the end of
1994, no troops integrated into NATO are allowed to be stationed
67
within the territory of the former German Democratic Republic.
After 1994 NATO troops can be stationed there, but they must be
German. No other NATO troops will be allowed. 68 After 1994, maneuvers of NATO troops within the territory of the former German
Democratic Republic will be possible only with the consent of the
German government. This consent will be given only with due regard
69
to the safety interests of the Soviet Union.
Irrespective of these treaty obligations, the Foreign Minister of the
Federal Republic of Germany officially declared on August 30, 1990,
the same commitments in the Vienna Negotiations on Arms Reductions. In view of the decision of the International Court of Justice in
the Nuclear Test Cases, 70 this unilateral declaration is already binding
on the Federal Republic of Germany.
Article 4 of the Final Settlement foresees the conclusion of a treaty
between unified Germany and the Soviet Union regulating the with72
drawal of Soviet troops.7 ' This treaty has already been concluded,
and Germany will pay 9 billion marks to help the Soviet Union with73
draw its troops.
66. Id. art. 3(1), 29 I.L.M. at 1189.
67. See id. art. 5(1), 29 I.L.M. at 1190.
68. See id. art. 5(3), 29 I.L.M. at 1191. It is worth mentioning that, according to article 5(2)
of the Treaty on Final Settlement Concerning Germany, troops of the Three Western Allied
Powers are, at German request, to remain stationed in Berlin for the duration of the presence of
Soviet troops in the territory of the former German Democratic Republic. Id. art. 5(2), 29
1.L.M. at 1191. The legal basis for this has already been established by the Exchange of Notes of
September 25, 1990 Concerning the Limited Stationing of the Troops of the Western Allied
Powers in Berlin. 1990 BGBI. I 1252.
69. This is not stated explicitly in the treaty itself, but it can be derived from comparing parts
I and 3 of article 5 and from the Agreed Minute to the Treaty referring to article 5(3). Final
Settlement, supra note 40, arts. 5(1), 5(3), 29 I.L.M. at 1190-91; Agreed Minute to the Treaty on
the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1193.
70. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20); (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457
(Dec. 20).
71. Final Settlement, supra note 40, art. 4, 29 I.L.M. at 1190.
72. Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Union der Sozialistischen
Sowjetrepubliken tiber die Bedingungen des befristeten Aufenthalts und die Modalitiiten des
planmiissigen Abzugs der sowjetischen Truppen aus dem Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Treaty on the Conditions of the Limited Presence and the Conduct of Withdrawal of Soviet
Troops on the Territory of the Federal Republic of Germany], Oct. 12, 1990, F.R.G.-U.S.S.R.,
1991 BGBI. II 258.
73. Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Regierung
der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken iber einige iuberleitende MaBnahmen [Agreement on Some Transitional Measures], Oct. 9, 1990, F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., arts. 2(1), 3(2), 4(4), 1990
BGBl. I 1655, 1656-57.
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Is a Peace Treaty with Germany Still Necessary?

Article 7 of the above mentioned General Treaty speaks of a peace
settlement for the whole of Germany as being an essential aim of the
actual policy of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the Three
Allied Powers. 74 Notwithstanding, it is extremely doubtful today
75
whether the conclusion of a peace treaty would make any sense.
The main purpose of a peace treaty is to end a status of war. This
main purpose can no longer be achieved as a status of war long ago
ceased to exist between the Allied Powers and the two German States.
It may be difficult to fix the exact date when the status of war ended,
but there is no doubt that the reestablishment of peaceful relations
between both German States and the Allied Powers ended the status
of war.

76

An additional traditional purpose of a peace treaty is the regulation of reparations. It is also very doubtful whether this is still an
open question. After extensive dismantling in its zone of occupation,
the Soviet Union officially declared that it no longer had any claims of
reparations toward either the German Democratic Republic or Germany as a whole. 77 The London Agreement 78 postponed but did not
settle the question of reparations between the Western Powers and the
Federal Republic of Germany. However, taking into account that the
Western Powers also substantially dismantled parts of the Federal Republic of Germany and that the Federal Republic has paid a considerable amount of money since its formation, 79 it is open to question
whether there is still a sound basis for a claim of reparations.
The regulation of borders is another important aspect of peace
treaties. Only the border between Germany and Poland can be seen as
a problem awaiting a final resolution.
3. The Border Between Germany and Poland
The Potsdam Conference of August 1945 showed the intention of
the Allied Powers to transfer German territory to Poland. Irrespec74. General Treaty, supra note 32, art. 7, 6 U.S.T. at 5601, 331 U.N.T.S. at 334, as amended
Oct. 23, 1954.
75. This view is shared by others. See, e.g., Frowein, supra note 28, at 21.
76. HERMAN MOSLER & KARL DOEHRING, DIE BEENDIGUNG DES KRIEGZUSTANDS MIT
DEUTSCHLAND NACH DEM ZWEITEN WELTKRIEG (Beitraige zum auslhindischen offentlichen
Recht und V61kefrecht No. 37, 1963).
77. See INSTITUT FOR EUROPAISCHE POLITIK UND WIRTSCHAFT, EUROPA-ARCHV 597475, 5981 (Wilhelm Cornides ed., 1953).
78. Agreement on German External Debts, Feb. 27, 1953, art. 5, 333 U.N.T.S. 3, 14.
79. Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Reparations after World War II, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 180, 181-83 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1982).
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tive of whether the Allied Powers had a legal capacity to transfer territory, it must be noted that the Potsdam Conference did not do so.80
Section IX of the communication of the Conference explicitly states
that "the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should
await the peace settlement." 8' This is reiterated by article 7 of the
General Treaty stating that the "final determination of the boundaries
of Germany must await [a peace settlement for the whole of
Germany] ."82
Notwithstanding, the German Democratic Republic concluded a
treaty with Poland on July 6, 1950 acknowledging the actual border
between the two States as permanent.8 3 When the Federal Republic of
Germany and Poland concluded a treaty on December 7, 1970,84 the

resolution of the border question was unclear, and, in a certain sense,
contradictory. Article 1 of this treaty says that the actual Polish western border is inviolable and that there will be no territorial claims toward Poland in the future.85 On the other hand, article 4 says that this
treaty does not affect former treaties.8 6 This provision aims, inter alia,
at article 2 of the General Treaty saying that the rights as to Germany
as a whole are retained by the Allied Powers.8 7 That means that the
Federal Republic of Germany was not entitled to answer definitely
questions about German territory. However, because of article I of
the treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland, the
Federal Republic is no longer free after unification to challenge the
Polish western border. This fact has been acknowledged by formal
declarations of the Bundestag and the Volkskammer.
This obligation is confirmed by article 1(2) of the Final Settlement
80. Jochen A. Frowein, Potsdam Agreements on Germany (1945), in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 79, at 141, 145-46; Kay Hailbronner, LegalAspects of
the Unification of the Two German States, 2 EuR. J. INT'L L. 19 (1991).
81. Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference of the Three Heads of
Government of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, Aug. 2, 1945,
reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON BERLIN 1943-1963, at 15, 21 (Wolfgang Heidelmeyer & Gunter
Hindrichs eds., 2d rev. ed. 1963).

82. General Treaty, supra note 32, art. 7, 6 U.S.T. at 5601, 331 U.N.T.S. at 334, as amended
Oct. 23, 1954.
83. Abkommen Ober die Markierung der festgelegten und bestehenden polnisch-deutschen

Staatsgrenze [Agreement Concerning the Demarcation of the Established and Existing PolishGerman State Frontier], July 6, 1950, Pol.-G.D.R., 319 U.N.T.S. 93, 104.
84. Vertrag zwischen der Volksrepublik Polen und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland uiber die

Grundlagen der Normalisierung ihrer Gegenseitigen Beziehungen [Agreement Concerning the
Basis for Normalization of Their Mutual Relations], Dec. 7, 1970, F.R.G.-Pol., 830 U.N.T.S.
327.

85. Id. art. 1, 830 U.N.T.S. at 332.
86. Id. art. 4, 830 U.N.T.S. at 334.
87. General Treaty, supra note 32, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 5600, 331 U.N.T.S. at 328, 330, as

amended Oct. 23, 1954.
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concerning Germany calling for unified Germany and Poland to confirm the border existing between them by a treaty binding under public
international law.88 Article 1(3) adds that unified Germany has no
territorial claims toward other States and will not raise such claims in
the future. 89 Meanwhile, a treaty has been worked out between unified
Germany and Poland confirming the actual border between the two
States. 90

III.

GERMAN UNIFICATION AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

A.

91

Change of the Problem

Until recently, the question was whether constitutional obligations
to struggle for the unification of Germany stood against further European integration. For example, the Federal Constitutional Court said
that the Federal Republic of Germany was not allowed to become a
member of a European Federal State because, in that case, it would no
longer be free to decide independently on German unification. 92 Today, the decisive question is whether membership in the European
Communities is an obstacle toward German unification as the latter
was said to depend on the approval of the other Member States of the
European Communities.
From its very beginning, the Federal Republic of Germany was
aware of a possible conflict between the two aims of German unification and European integration. Therefore, on February 28, 1957, it
made a formal declaration during the negotiations for the treaty establishing the European Economic Community, that "[t]he Federal Government starts from the idea that in the case of German unification
there will be the possibility of a revision of the treaty .... ,

88. Final Settlement, supra note 40, art. 1(2), 29 I.L.M. at 1188.
89. Id. art. 3, 29 I.L.M. at 1189.
90. Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik Polen iiber die Bestitigung der zwischen ihnen bestehenden Grenzen, Nov. 14, 1990, F.R.G.-Pol., 134 BULLETIN
(Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung) 1394.
91. For a more detailed analysis, see Randelzhofer, supra note 51, at 101. See also Thomas
Giegerich, The European Dimension of German Reunification: East Germany's Integration into
the European Communities, 51 ZA6RV 386 (1991); Jean-Paul Jacqu6, German Unification and
the European Community, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (1991); Stefan Oeter, German Unification and
State Succession, 51 ZA6RV 370 (1991).
92. Judgment of Oct. 22, 1986, 73 BVerfGE 339, 375 (F.R.G.); Judgment of June 23, 1981,
58 BVerfGE 1, 40 (F.R.G.); Judgment of July 31, 1973, 36 BVerfGE 1, 28-29 (F.R.G.).
93. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 3660, at 1 [hereinafter the German Declaration].
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B. Is a Change of the EEC Treaty Required
by German Unification?
This question must take into account that German unification will
be brought about through Article 23 of the Basic Law, i.e., by the
incorporation of the German Democratic Republic into the Federal
Republic of Germany. In one of his early statements, the president of
the Commission of the European Communities, Mr. Delors, was of
the opinion that, even in this case, membership of unified Germany
required the admissions procedure of a new Member State under article 237 of the EEC Treaty. 94 That would require a unanimous decision of the Council, the consent of the European Parliament by
absolute majority, and approval by all EC Member States.95 Such a
procedure could have risked Germany's continued membership.
Today, however, it is the almost universal view of legal writers and
politicians that the Federal Republic's EC membership will remain
unchanged in substance by the incorporation of the German Democratic Republic and that the EEC Treaty will be extended automatiThis
cally to the territory of the German Democratic Republic. 96
97
view is also expressed by article 10 of the Unification Treaty.
There is no article within the EEC Treaty dealing explicitly with
the problem of a change in size of the territory of a Member State.
Article 237 is not applicable as it only deals with the admission of new
Member States.98 Article 227(1) enumerates all the Member States of
the EC, including the Federal Republic of Germany. 99 It could be
interpreted, in my view, in the sense that the enumerated States are
members of the EC regardless of the actual size of their State territory.
However, it is the view of almost all the writers that this provision
does not deal with the problem of a change in size of the territory of
°
the Member States.10
There is some practice of the European Communities automa94. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Feb. 15, 1990, at 1.

95.

TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

[EEC

TREATY] art.

237.
96. See, e.g., Christian Tomuschat, A United Germany Within the European Community, 27
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 415, 418 (1990).

97. Unification Treaty, supra note 10, art. 10, 30 I.L.M. at 471.
98. EEC TREATY art. 237.
99. Id. art. 227(1).
100. See, e.g., Waldemar Hummer, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG art. 227 n.4
(Eberhard Grabitz ed., 1984 & Supp. 1989); Jean-Paul Jacqu6, L'Unificationde l'Allemagne et la
CommunautdEuropdenne,94 REVUE GINtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 997, 1000
(1990); Paul Reuter & Piet-Hein Houben, Article 227, in 5 THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN EcoNOMIC COMMUNITY: A COMMENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY 6-216.08, 6-216.111 (Hans Smit

& Peter E. Herzog eds., 1991).
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tically extending the treaties to the enlarged territory of a Member
State. When, in 1956, the Saar was incorporated into the Federal Republic of Germany, the treaty establishing the European Coal and
Steel Community was automatically extended to the Saar, as far as the
Federal Republic of Germany was concerned. This automatic extension also took place when, in 1956, the islands of St.-Pierre-et-Miquelon became D6partements d'Outre-Mer of France. However, it is
doubtful whether these two examples are comparable to the enlargement of the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany by the incorporation of the German Democratic Republic.
Notwithstanding, it is the common view today that the law of the
European Communities will be extended to the territory of the former
German Democratic Republic after German unification. This is derived from the law of State succession as shown above.
However, there is still a special problem within the law of State
succession. It is maintained by some writers that the rules of State
succession are not applicable to long term economic treaties based explicitly or implicitly on the population, the territory, and/or the economic strength of each of the Member States.
Irrespective of EEC Treaty article 148, which stipulates weighted
voting in the Council, the EEC Treaty is not a treaty of the character
just mentioned. Article 148 alludes to these items only in a very levelling way.10 1 Thus it turns out that EC membership is no real obstacle
to German unification and that the consent of the other Member
States of the EC is not required for this end. On the other hand, just
as German unification affects foreign policy issues as a whole, the Federal Republic of Germany was obliged by article 30(2)(a) of the Single
European Act 10 2 to enter into consultations with the European Communities when negotiating both the Treaty of May 18, 1990 establishing economic, financial, and social union with the German
Democratic Republic 10 3 and the Unification Treaty of August 31,
1990.104 These requirements have been fulfilled.I°5
10 6
After all, the EEC Treaty need not and will not be changed.
101. EEC TREATY art. 148.
102. Single European Act, Feb. 28, 1986, art. 30(2)(a).
103. Treaty Establishing a Monetary, Economic and Social Union, May 18, 1990, F.R.G.G.D.R., 29 I.L.M. 1108.
104. Unification Treaty, supra note 10.
105. See Commission, German Unification and Relations with the GDR, 23 BULL. EC, Oct.
1990, No. 6 at 27.
106. See Jacqui, supra note 100, at 1003; Hans-Werner Rengeling, Das vereinigte Deutschland in der Europdischen Gemeinschaft: Grundlagen zur Geltung des Gemeinschaftsrechts, 105
DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLA'r 1307, 1308 (No. 23 1990); C.W.A. Timmermans, German
Unification and Community Law, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 437, 438 (1990).
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The Federal Republic of Germany and the other Member States
would, though, be entitled to claim such a change based on the German declaration of February 28, 1957.107 That declaration qualifies as
a means of interpretation of the treaty in the sense of article 31 (2)(b) of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of May 23, 1969.108 In
my view, this declaration entitles not only the Federal Republic of
Germany but also, by way of reciprocity, the other Member States to
claim a change of the EEC Treaty. On April 4, 1990, the Federal
Republic of Germany officially declared to the European Parliament
that it does not claim any change of the treaty.1°9 No other Member
State has claimed such a change.
C. Necessity of TransitionalRegulations of Adaptation110
The automatic extension of the EEC Treaty to the territory of the
former German Democratic Republic might be a satisfactory overall
legal solution to the problem of German membership in the European
Communities. On the other hand, such an automatic extension will
cause considerable practical problems. The enterprises in the territory
of the former German Democratic Republic are currently not able to
withstand free competition. It will be impossible for them to comply
immediately with the technical standards of the European Communities. The same is true for EC environmental standards. Without special regulations, the Commission of the European Communities will
repeatedly sue unified Germany under article 169 for failure to fulfill
its treaty obligations."'
The Commission has already tackled the problem by delivering on
August 21, 1990 to the European Parliament and to the governments
of the Member States the draft of a comprehensive set of transitional
regulations.1 1 2 The Commission was also prepared to take preliminary measures on its own account in case the Council and the Member
States did not succeed in bringing about the necessary regulations in
time. Meanwhile, on September 17, 1990, the Council of Ministers of
107. German Declaration, supra note 93.
108. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art.
31(2)(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
109. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Apr. 5, 1990, at 2.

110. For further discussion, see Kay Hailbronner, Volker- und europarechtliche Fragen der
deutschen Wiedervereinigung,45 JURISTENZEITUNG 449, 456 (1990); Rengeling, supra note 106,

at 1311; Timmermans, supra note 106, at 444.
111. EEC TREATY art. 169.
112. The European Parliament had already adopted, on July 12, 1990, a resolution on the
effects of German unification on the European Community recognizing the necessity of transitional adaptation regulations. 1990 O.J. (C 231) 154.
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the European Communities empowered the Commission to take the
relevant measures to cope with the problem of transition and adaption
13
and therefore to create preliminary regulations.1
The transitional regulations for adaptation will be almost the same
as those used in the cases of admission of new Member States. The
treaty and the main bulk of regulations will not be changed, but the
applicability, at least the full applicability, of some parts will be
postponed.
This example is from the accession of Spain and Portugal to the
European Communities. Articles 31 and 190 of the Act annexed to
the Treaty of June 12, 1985 Concerning the Accession of Spain and
Portugal provide for the progressive abolition of the customs between
Spain and Portugal on the one hand and the other Member States of
the European Communities on the other." 4 The full applicability of
EEC Treaty article 9 and the articles following it was postponed to
January 1, 1993.115 Accession Act articles 37 and 197 foresee the progressive introduction of the Common Customs Tariff with total effectiveness on January 1, 1993.116 The same date is set in Accession Act
articles 55 and 215 and the articles following them for the full applicability of EEC Treaty article 48 and the relevant regulations for the free
movement of workers. 117 The full applicability of the provisions on
agriculture is postponed by Accession Act articles 67 and 233 until
January 1, 1996.118
As far as the territory of the former German Democratic Republic
is concerned, the proposals of the Commission foresee the general
postponement of the full applicability of most of the "sensitive" provisions of the EEC Treaty until January 1, 1993.119 The applicability of
the environmental provisions of the EEC shall be postponed until January 1, 1996.120
It can be said that the problems concerning the EC in connection
with the German unification are far from a real obstacle. The EC
113. For a survey of preliminary measures, see Commission, German Unification and Relations with the German Democratic Republic, 23 BULL. EC, No. 9, at 8 (1990). See also Rengeling, supra note 106, at 1311 (evaluating relevant legal instruments).
114. Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic and the Adjustments to the Treaties, 1985 O.J. (L 302) 23, 29, 81.
115. See id., tit. II, ch. 1, at 28; tit. III, ch. 1, at 81.
116. Id. art. 37, at 30; art. 197, at 83.
117. Id. art. 55, at 35; art. 215, at 88.
118. Id. art. 67, at 38; art. 233, at 91.
119. Commission, The Community and German Unification, BULL. EC, Supp. 4/90, at 27,
50 (1990).
120. Id. at 100-05.
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membership of the Federal Republic of Germany has turned out not
1 21
to be a substantial barrier to German unity.
CONCLUSION

To most people, German unification, especially the quick way it
was brought about, seems to be sort of a political miracle. Others,
especially partisans of Hegel's philosophy, might be tempted not to
speak of a miracle, but of a performance of the ruse of reason (a List
der Vernunft). The retained rights of the Four Allied Powers to Germany as a whole, repeatedly criticized during the last years as outdated, were the very center of the preservation of the last remnants of
German unity, impeding definite cessation into two completely separate States.
Hopefully, German unity will help to overcome the division of Europe, for the division of Germany was not mainly a consequence of the
East-West split but one of its major reasons.

121. See Tomuschat, supra note 96, at 436. See also Hans-Jiirgen Wolff, Schrittweise Herstellung der deutschen Einheit und Europaisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, 43 NJW 2168 (1990).

